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This essay discusses the powers and limitations of the Federal Reserve’s role as Lender of 
Last Resort and how it deployed those powers during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. It 
considers the Fed’s authorities and the frameworks that it relied on in utilizing its powers to 
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In May of 2008, the U.S. financial crisis was almost a year old, but it was in a sense only 
beginning to get scary. We were somewhere between Bear Stearns and Lehman. The actions 
in March by the Federal Reserve with the support of the Treasury to help contain the damage 
from Bear Stearns had slowed the ongoing “run” on the U.S. financial system but had not 
arrested it.  
 
Over the late spring and summer, fear of recession intensified, house prices fell further, and 
defaults on mortgages increased, adding to fears about the viability of the rest of the financial 
system. This was a period when the gap between our ends and our means was the widest in 
the crisis. 
 
Most of the burden for containing the growing risks during these months between February 
and October of 2008, the period before Congress passed emergency authority to recapitalize 
the financial system and expand the scope of the FDIC’s guarantees, was left to the Federal 
Reserve’s lender of last resort authority.  
 
As a result, this is a valuable period to understand both the power and the limits of the lender 
of last resort in a financial crisis. What problems in a financial crisis can the lender of last 
resort help address, and what problems lie beyond the scope of those tools? What defined 
the limits of the Fed’s emergency authority? Why lend beyond banks? Why was the Fed able 
to help save Bear and AIG, but not Lehman?  
 
Bagehot’s classic framework for the lender of last resort was elegantly simple. His 
prescription reduced over time to its essence was that, in a crisis, the central bank should 
lend freely against good securities at a penalty rate.   
 
“A panic,” Bagehot wrote, “in a word, is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of 
science you must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve [the central bank] must … 
advance it most freely for the liabilities of others. They must lend to merchants, to minor 
bankers, to ‘this man and that man,’ whenever the security is good. In wild periods of alarm, 
one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the 
primary failure which causes them.” 
 
Bagehot’s framework by itself, however, does not provide an adequate guide for many of the 
key questions policy makers face in a financial crisis: How broadly should the central bank 
lend? How much risk should the central bank take? How much damage should it try to 
mitigate?  The simplicity of Bagehot’s framework is also challenged when applied to our 
more complex financial system where banks are not overwhelmingly dominant, and non-
banks as well as direct funding markets play a key role in the provision of credit to the 
economy. 
 
Although the focus here is on actions within the Federal Reserve’s authority, Secretary 
Paulson and the U.S. Treasury played a key role in helping shape our overall strategy 
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throughout this early period. We consulted closely as the crisis intensified, we worked 
closely together in trying to prevent the failures of the investment banks and AIG and to 
address problems in the broader funding markets, and we explicitly sought the written 
support of the Secretary of the Treasury in using our emergency authority in the Bear 
Stearns and AIG interventions.  
 
In this crisis, as in most, we were forced to go well beyond Bagehot. Ultimately the U.S. 
government had to deploy a much broader arsenal of emergency authorities, including 
guarantees and capital, to break the panic and prevent the collapse of the financial system. 
The challenges we faced in this phase of the crisis, before we were able to deploy those more 
powerful tools, provide a valuable prism through which to assess the post crisis reforms to 
the lender of last resort and emergency powers of the government.  
 
This essay is organized as follows:  
1.  Observations on the Fragility of Financial Systems 
2.  The Structure of the U.S. Financial System on the Eve of the Crisis 
3.  The Limits of the Pre-Crisis Emergency Financial Authorities in the United States 
4.  The U.S. Response in the Early Phases of the Crisis 
5.  A Framework for Escalation  
6.  Interventions for Specific Financial Institutions 
7.  Lessons from This Phase of the Crisis  
8.  An Assessment of the Emergency Authorities Going Forward: Where Do We Stand 
Today? 
1. Observations on the Fragility of Financial Systems 
 
Financial systems are inherently unstable and vulnerable to runs. And the U.S. financial 
system was particularly fragile on the eve of the crisis.  
 
Financial systems are fragile because they exist to meet two important economic needs—the 
need for people and businesses to have a place to hold cash to which they can have access on 
demand and without fear of loss, and the need to be able to borrow to finance longer term 
endeavors that involve risk. Banks, and entities like banks, exist to provide both functions, 
issuing “risk fee” liabilities like deposits to finance “risky” things like loans. This role—
transforming something that needs to be perceived as safe and liquid into something that is 
neither—is fraught with risk. If people decide they need the cash because they fear for its 
safety, banks do not have the ability to immediately take back the funds they have lent out. 
This creates the danger of runs and panics, which can threaten the stability of the financial 
system and cause severe recessions.  
 
To mitigate this risk, policy makers in modern economies have tried a changing mix of 
prudential regulations and the safety net to reduce the probability that things go wrong. This 
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is hard to get right. You can get a sense of the complexity of this challenge in the tragic history 
of financial crises and the recurrence of financial panics and deep recessions.  
 
The challenge of building a financial engine that works under the most exacting conditions 
is about the design of the regulatory constraints on risk and the safety net for when those 
defenses fail. The prudential limits or “defenses” are not built—even at the much higher 
levels required today—to be sufficient to prevent failures of any individual “bank” or to 
prevent any and all financial crises. This is necessarily the case because to build a prudential 
regime where there was no risk of failure would prevent banks from being able to engage in 
maturity transformation and lending. The capital regime assumes the existence of a safety 
net for the extreme crisis—a set of protections from the central bank and the government 
that includes deposit insurance, funding from the lender of last resort, government 
guarantees, capital injections, nationalization, or special bankruptcy type regimes for failing 
institutions, and a Keynesian arsenal of fiscal and monetary policy tools to limit the severity 
of recessions. 
2. The Structure of the U.S. Financial System on the Eve of the Crisis 
 
In the decades before the crisis, the United States financial system had gradually outgrown 
the various protections that had been put in place after the Great Depression. These 
protections—a combination of limits on risk and a safety net composed of deposit insurance 
and routine access to loans from the Fed—applied only to depository institutions. Over time, 
the commercial banks had lost their dominant share of the financial system. (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 2011). 
 
In 2007 they were slightly less than half of the financial system. The rest of the financial 
system—investment banks, money market funds, large financial firms like AIG and GE 
Capital, large government sponsored mortgage firms—operated outside these protections 
and oversight, without effective constraints on risk or the protections of the bank safety net. 
 
The financial system had financed a decades-long rise in household debt and helped fuel a 
long rise in house prices. When the housing boom crested and fears of the coming recession 
intensified in late 2006, a large part of the U.S. financial system looked vulnerable. 
 
This fragility had built up over a long time but it had been masked by a long period of 
economic and financial stability. It was a reflection of the broader imbalances in the U.S. 
economy. It had been fed by a set of “beliefs” that funding would remain readily available, 
that future recessions would be modest, that house prices would never fall at a national level, 
and that the low level of losses in past recessions was a good guide to future losses in the 
financial system.  
 
Over time, risk had migrated around the regulatory constraints that applied to banks, and 
the market share of the banks declined, and the relative importance of the rest of the system 
increased. The supervisory system had not evolved with the market. 
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Banks were subject to a complex regime of capital requirements and prudential regulations; 
no equivalent system of constraint on leverage was applied to the rest of the financial system. 
These different parts of the U.S. financial system were closely integrated, which meant 
weakness in one area could spread to other parts of the system.  
 
Overall, the financial system had too little capital to provide a credible cushion against the 
rising estimates of losses as the crisis intensified, and the capital that existed was distributed 
in ways that made the danger more severe. In general, the capital cushions were thinnest 
where the regulations were weakest, funding was less stable, and there was less access to 
the safety net. The institutions most dependent on less stable sources of funding and more 
reliant on short term funding did not have adequate capital to reassure their creditors as the 
crisis intensified.  
 
The capital regime that applied to banks, although more conservative than that which 
applied to the rest of the financial system, was also too thin to cover the more extreme 
estimates of plausible losses banks might face as the severity of the recession became more 
evident. And the capital in the banking system was not sufficient to allow the banking system 
to compensate for the failures across the rest of the financial system.  
 
In the United States, there was no entity with the authority to safeguard the stability of the 
overall financial system. The provision in the Federal Reserve’s mandate to foster financial 
stability did not come with the means to constrain risk outside the banking system. Prior 
efforts in the U.S. to strengthen this weak and balkanized oversight structure had foundered 
in part because the financial system appeared to work.  
 
This system had proven to be pretty resilient across a range of different, relatively moderate 
recessions, market downturns, and financial failures. But this system was less stable, and 
harder to stabilize in the extreme crisis. The longer period of relative stability helped create 
the conditions for the more extreme crisis by encouraging the migration of risk outside the 
banking system to institutions that were outside the safety net. 
3. The Limits of the Pre-Crisis Emergency Financial Authorities in the 
United States  
 
On the eve of the crisis, the U.S. had a relatively weak set of tools in its arsenal, weak relative 
to the nature of risk in the system and weak relative to other major economies. 
 
The financial strength of the United States gave us powerful Keynesian tools. Nominal short 
term interest rates were high enough at roughly 5 percent in the summer of 2007 to allow 
the Fed substantial room to lower rates as the risks of recession rose. With total debt of the 
Federal government at roughly 40 percent of GDP, the United States had substantial fiscal 
room to provide temporary stimulus in the form of tax cuts and spending programs. These 
tools were essential to helping limit the severity of the recession, but they were not sufficient.  
5
Reflections on the Lender of Last Resort Geithner
The U.S. financial arsenal included a well-developed safety net for banks composed of the 
Fed’s discount window for lending to banks, the protections of the FDIC’s deposit insurance 
scheme. Together these provided strong protections against bank runs.  
 
Importantly, the FDIC could also intervene to manage the failure of a bank. The FDIC’s 
resolution regime operated much like the bankruptcy regime for normal business, with the 
FDIC improvement that the FDIC could act as the provider of financing during the 
restructuring or liquidation and also as the arbiter of how to restructure or dispose of the 
assets of the institution. This authority included the ability, in the context of a severe financial 
crisis, to guarantee the liabilities of the bank or even the bank holding company, in order to 
prevent the failure of a bank, and limit the damage that might be caused to the rest of the 
financial system by a default.  
 
These tools, however, only existed for banks, which at that time accounted for slightly less 
than half of the financial system. The tools available to manage weakness in the rest of the 
financial system were relatively limited.  
 
In 2007, no part of the U.S. government had authority to inject capital into any bank, non-
bank, or other part of the financial system. And the United States had no regime equivalent 
to the FDIC’s resolution regime for banks to manage the failure of large non-banks, like 
investment banks or insurance companies.  
 
The Federal Reserve could only purchase Treasuries and agency securities. Unlike many 
other major central banks, the central bank of the United States had only limited authority 
to buy municipal government securities, and could not buy corporate bonds, commercial 
paper, non-agency ABS, or equities, which limited its ability in a crisis to address a 
breakdown in those important funding markets. 
 
The Federal Reserve did have statutory authority that could be used to provide financing 
outside the banking system in an emergency. This authority, which had not been used since 
the Great Depression, was subject to several conditions. Under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act (FRA)2  we could lend to a non-bank, but only if we determined that 
circumstances were “unusual and exigent," if the borrower could not access other sources of
                                                          
2 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). FRA Section 13(3), as in effect in September 2008, provides: “In unusual and exigent 
circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than 
five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, [to provide loans to] any individual, partnership, or 
corporation, [when such loans are] secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That 
before [providing any such loan] for an individual or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve bank 
shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions.” The statute does not define its key phrases, “unusual and 
exigent circumstance” or “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.” (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve). In the four years after the section was adopted in 1932, the Fed made a total of 123 loans 
totaling just $1.5 million. Section 13(3) was not used again until 2008, 76 years later. See also Mehra (2010) 
for a discussion of the Fed’s usage of its emergency powers during the crisis. 
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funding in the market, and if the loans could be secured to our satisfaction.3 
 
The Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority was powerful because it could be used 
to help mitigate a broad loss of funding. But it had limited effect in an extreme crisis, one that 
extended beyond a need for liquidity. Neither the Fed’s, the SEC's or the FDIC's authority 
provided the ability to provide capital to or guarantee the liabilities of non-banks.4  
 
 
The Limits of the Emergency Authority under FRA Section 13(3) 
The emergency authority in the Federal Reserve Act limited the terms on which the Fed 
could provide funding beyond the banking system, even during a systemic crisis. Such 
funding was available only if certain criteria were met including: (i) “unusual and exigent 
circumstances” existed, (ii) the borrower had no access to private funding, and (iii) the loan 
was “secured to the satisfaction of the [lending] Federal Reserve bank.” Section 13(3) 
provided the authority to lend to non-bank financial institutions, but not to provide capital, 
or guarantee creditors against loss. The defining difference between a loan and capital is that 
a loan is expected to be repaid, whereas equity capital provides a cushion against losses. This 
difference is underscored by the requirement in Section 13(3) that permits the Fed to lend 
only to the extent the Reserve Bank was secured as a lender—that is, the Reserve Bank had 
to believe that there was sufficient collateral or other protection to provide a reasonable 
prospect of full repayment. Because of this limitation, lending under 13(3) could not be made 
to carry the power of equity or a guarantee. 
 
The law gave the Fed room for judgment on how to evaluate how much that collateral was 
worth, but that discretion was limited. We could decide to take a fair amount of risk, by, for 
example, looking at what the firm’s assets might be worth over a longer time frame. We also 
had some discretion in deciding what margin of safety we needed against loss. This meant 
that we could choose to lend to an institution or an affiliate of an institution that might be on 
the edge of failure to allow time for a more orderly liquidation, which generally would 
mitigate the damage to the system, but only to the extent we had security sufficient to cover 
the value of our loan.  
 
The standard interpretation of the role of funding from the lender of last resort is that 
lending can help reduce the risk that the strong become illiquid, but it cannot make viable 
the fundamentally nonviable.5 
                                                          
3 In 1991, the Federal Reserve Act was amended to make it clear, in the words of the committee report, that “in 
[…] an emergency, the Federal Reserve must be able to ensure the liquidity of the financial system, including if 
necessary by the use of advances [loans] to securities firms” (U.S. Congress 1991). 
 
4 The FDIC did have authority to guarantee the liabilities of bank holding companies.  
 
5 Madigan (2009) discusses the Fed’s crisis management in light of Bagehot’s dictum—“Traditional central 
banking principles also tell us to lend only to solvent institutions and only against good collateral, but 
complying with these standards in a crisis is not entirely straightforward.” Cline and Gagnon (2013) assert that 
“…federal officials, at least in hindsight, appear to have followed the dictum of Walter Bagehot [], which has 
guided central banks for almost 150 years.” Posner (2016) claims that “Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed was 
7
Reflections on the Lender of Last Resort Geithner
Bagehot’s dictum was that central banks should lend freely at a high rate of interest against 
“good” assets. He did not explicitly state that the central bank should only lend to “solvent” 
institutions.  
 
The emergency provision of the Federal Reserve Act did not explicitly require a finding of 
solvency.6 This acknowledged the practical reality that solvency is hard to determine.7 A 
judgment of solvency depends on the value of the assets of the firm and the strength of its 
businesses. These depend on the distribution of expected losses. These values are difficult to 
determine in normal times. They are particularly hard to assess in the midst of a crisis, when 
funding has eroded, the value of assets has fallen steeply, and the trust and confidence 
necessary for a financial institution to function are eroding.  
 
The limiting condition in the Federal Reserve Act—the ability to lend up to, but not in excess 
of, the value of the available security, less some margin of safety to protect the central bank 
from losses—limits the value of the tool in preventing the failure of a weak financial 
institution.  
 
The absence of an explicit solvency test in the Federal Reserve Act has not been interpreted 
within the Federal Reserve to mean that the lending tools could or should be used to sustain 
firms that are not viable. To lend freely to the nonviable is unlikely to work. And such lending 
carries other risks. Among these is the risk it leaves the central bank with large losses. It 
could increase moral hazard risks.8 It may take the central bank into policy areas that most 
deem the provenance of the fiscal authorities.  
 
The general approach that has defined central bank practice and that certainly affected our 
view of what was appropriate was that the lender of last resort facilities should be available 
to the relatively strong, even if they were suffering the signs of illiquidity, and generally not 
available to those that were at the weaker extreme and thus less likely to be viable. 
                                                          
understood to be the LLR for solvent banks and non-banks. FDIC was the LLR for insolvent banks. There was 
no LLR for insolvent non-banks. Porter (2009) argues that—“Section 13(3) grants the Fed expansive authority 
in ‘unusual and exigent circumstances,’ without requiring a stringent legal standard be met in order to respond 
to crises.” While Mehra (2010) does not definitively conclude that the Fed’s decision not to lend to Lehman was 
consistent with its legal authority under Section 13(3), he does concede that the decision as to the sufficiency 
of Lehman’s collateral was a decision within its discretion.  
 
6 It should be noted that although the law did not require a finding of solvency then, it does now. Section 1101(a) 
of Dodd Frank added a provision: “The Board shall establish procedures to prohibit borrowing from programs 
and facilities by borrowers that are insolvent.” 12 U.S. Code § 343(B)(ii).  
 
7 Thomas Baxter made the useful point that there are other definitions of solvency, such as a failure to pay your 
debts as they come due or when the level of capital to total assets falls below a regulatory minimum. See for 
example Heaton (2007). 
 
8 Henry Thornton, who wrote about the lender of last resort in 1802, before Bagehot, explained—“It is by no 
means intended to imply, that it would become the Bank of England to relieve every distress which the rashness 
of country banks may bring upon them; the bank [meaning the Bank of England], by doing this, might encourage 
their improvidence.” (Goodhart 1999).  
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One last piece of this framework involves what might be called the implicit or persuasive 
powers of the central banks and the government.  
 
In the financial crisis of the early 20th century, before the reforms that followed the Great 
Depression, the model for dealing with a dangerous financial failure was for J.P. Morgan or 
the New York Clearing House to convene the major banks and convince them that it was in 
their collective interest to help rescue the weakest among them. (Gorton 2012). The more 
recent example of the deft use of these powers was Bill McDonough’s successful effort in 
1998 to put together a consortium of financial firms in order to prevent a disorderly 
liquidation of the large hedge fund Long-Term Capital management (LTCM). An important 
part of what bank supervisors and central banks can do in a crisis is to arrange a rescue of 
the weak by the relatively strong.  
 
This strategy works in situations where the strong are strong enough to absorb the weak. It 
is unlikely to work if a whole class of institutions is weak and the entire system fragile.  
 
Putting all this together, the emergency financial powers of the United States on the eve of 
the crisis were designed for a bank-dominated financial system, not for the complex financial 
system we had in 2007. The tools were more designed to address liquidity problems, rather 
than problems of inadequate capital. The powers available to manage the failure of a large 
institution were limited to banks and did not exist for the rest of the financial system. Overall, 
the system was better positioned to deal with an idiosyncratic shock than a systemic 
financial crisis. It had worked reasonably well for the crisis of the previous several decades, 
but was not up to the challenge of confronting a classic financial panic.  
 
It’s also worth noting that the U.S. emergency arsenal was, in important respects, weaker 
than that available to the authorities in the other major economies. This relative weakness 
was partly a function of the fact that most other major financial systems were dominated by 
universal banks, while our system limited the activities of banks and divided financial 
activities among banks and non-banks. This meant the defenses of prudential regulation and 
the safety net applied more broadly in most other economies than in the United States. In 
addition, most other central banks had broader standing authority to intervene in a financial 
crisis, not just because of the broader reach of their traditional lending facilities, but also 
because many had the authority to purchase a much broader range of financial assets than 
did the Federal Reserve. This would prove extremely valuable in helping prevent a more 
damaging collapse in asset values and in funding markets. Finally, parliamentary systems of 
government typically had more ability to legislate additional emergency authority in the 
crisis than did the United States system, with its greater separation between executive and 
legislative branches and the periodic reality that the party of the President might not control 
either house of Congress. In the United States, the President’s authority to deal with a 
systemic financial crisis, without action by Congress, was essentially limited to closing the 
equity markets and declaring a bank holiday.  
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4. The U.S. Response in the Early Phases of the Crisis 
 
By February of 2008, the stability of the financial system was eroding. The Fed had cut 
interest rates aggressively. However, monetary policy alone could not address weakness in 
the financial system, and the weakness in the financial system limited the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in offsetting the slowing economy. On February 13, Congress enacted the 
Economic Stimulus Act, which included a $45 billion package of tax cuts for businesses to help 
offset the contraction in private demand. The stimulus provided an early if modest support 
for the weakening economy.  
 
In addition to the interest rate cuts, the Federal Reserve had taken several actions to provide 
funding to banks through the discount window, reducing the interest rate at which banks 
could borrow, lengthening the terms they could borrow, and encouraging borrowing by 
trying to reduce the stigma of coming to the Fed window. These programs were valuable, but 
they were most actively used by foreign banks. Most U.S. banks were not, at that point, 
experiencing material funding pressure, and were not eager to risk being thought of as weak 
because they borrowed from the Fed. The availability of funding for the Fed on more 
favorable terms was not effective in encouraging banks to lend more to the rest of the 
financial system. Even at that relatively early point in the crisis, banks were husbanding their 
capital and reluctant to lend to the weaker parts of the financial system in the United States.  
 
The funding markets, though still working, were showing signs of strain. The pressures 
which had started on the periphery of the financial system, were starting to move closer to 
the center of the system.  
 
Several of the major U.S. banks and investment banks and the large foreign banks had raised 
capital in the fourth quarter of 2007. This was valuable but not enough. The price of 
securities most exposed to the rising mortgage defaults and to the broader risks of an 
intensifying recession continued to deteriorate. Assets that were rated AAA and whose 
prices had never declined more than a few basis points were down by a five, then 10 percent 
and even further.  
 
The weakest parts of the financial system had been trying to reduce their exposure to the 
types of assets perceived to be at most risk, and the market was less willing to fund those 
assets, and less willing to provide funding to the weaker institutions. There were more 
troubling signs of fire sales, fears of additional forced selling, and increases in margin and 
haircuts. This dynamic, always dangerous, was feeding on itself. Fear was contagious.  
 
Up to this point, the Federal Reserve had used what you might call the conventional arsenal 
of tools. The first test of the emergency authorities, the less conventional tools, came in late 
February and early March of 2008. In those weeks, it became harder and harder for non-bank 
financial firms to fund their portfolios of assets apart from Treasuries, and the market began 
to pull back from the weakest of the independent investment banks, Bear Stearns.  
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We didn’t know how bad it might get. We couldn’t foresee how the ongoing “run” might 
evolve, and how rapidly and broadly it might spread. We had only limited knowledge about 
the potential severity of losses and which parts of the financial system were most exposed 
to losses, because of the limited reach of our supervisory authorities and the fundamental 
uncertainty that complicated any assessment of the likely depth of the recession and the 
incidence of losses.  
 
We did, however, come to adopt what you might call a general framework for thinking about 
what should be done and how to balance the many competing objectives that had to inform 
strategy in a crisis. I am going to describe this framework, at least as I understood it, 
recognizing that my colleagues at the New York Fed, the Federal Reserve Board, and the 
Treasury might describe it differently and express it better.  
 
This framework didn’t provide a perfectly clear guide to navigate the challenges ahead. It 
had to evolve over time. And, of course, we had to translate this framework into concrete 
things that were feasible with the authority we had and the tools we could invent. No plan 
survives first contact with a crisis. Ultimately, our actions were determined by what was 
feasible in the moment.  
5. A Framework for Escalation 
 
Our objective was to achieve a soft landing for the economy, not to try to sustain the 
unsustainable. After a substantial increase in borrowing relative to income, a substantial rise 
in housing and other asset prices, and a dangerous increase in risk in the financial system, 
asset prices had to fall back to earth. There would be considerable financial losses and the 
failure of many financial institutions. The Fed could not and should not try to prevent that 
adjustment from happening, but we had to try to limit the risk it went too far and caused too 
much damage to the economy.  
 
We were constantly weighing two different types of risk. On the one hand, we were 
concerned about the risk of doing too much, too soon. To escalate too early and to try to 
prevent a necessary adjustment would risk one type of problem: trying to sustain the 
unsustainable might add to moral hazard risks and impose long term costs on the economy.  
 
But we were always concerned about the other risk: the risk of falling too far behind the 
curve. If we were too tentative or too slow, the run on the financial system might get too 
much force and be harder to manage.   
 
The Generally Available Funding Programs.  
 
In deciding how to escalate—how fast and how far to extend the scope of the funding, and 
how much risk to take—our focus was on how to preserve the functioning of those parts of 
the financial system that were the most critical to the economy. We believed the appropriate 
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role of the central bank was to keep the core of the financial system liquid, to try to limit the 
risk of a broad fire sale of assets and a substantial overshooting of asset prices.  
 
We used the Fed’s emergency lender of last resort tools to provide a funding backstop to the 
parts of the financial system that operated alongside the banking system. Although we 
couldn’t use the funding tools to replicate the protections of a guarantee against losses, we 
tried to replicate the example from the classic bank runs of the past when banks had placed 
gold or silver in the window to reassure depositors that they didn’t need to rush to take their 
money out. If financial institutions like investment banks knew they could borrow from the 
Fed to replace a loss of funding from the market then they would be less likely to sell assets 
into the panicky markets. If the creditors of those institutions knew they had access to the 
Fed backstop, then the creditors would be less likely to reduce their exposure to those 
institutions.  
 
The typical crisis starts slowly but can accelerate dramatically. You need to try to be 
preemptive. If you establish the backstop after the run has too much momentum, then it will 
not be effective. The condition in Section 13(3) requiring that the borrower be “unable to 
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions” made it hard to act 
as early as might have been ideal. In a sense, the statute required that we wait until there 
was an acute loss of funding before lending. We interpreted this to allow us to activate a new 
emergency facility if there was a dangerous erosion in funding conditions that created the 
possibility of a complete loss of access to liquidity.  
 
As conditions deteriorated and the risk of collapse in markets spread, we deployed a 
progressively broader backstop with progressively greater force. In most cases, but not all, 
we deployed the new facilities before a particular funding market was shut down or a critical 
class of institutions completely lost funding.  
 
Given the structure of the U.S. financial system, constructing a credible funding backstop 
required support for different types of financial institutions, like banks, investment banks 
and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and it required programs that supported 
different types of funding markets, like commercial paper and asset back securities. These 
two types of programs were what you might call generally available programs, i.e. available 
on similar terms for certain classes of firms and financial instruments.  
 
The programs for institutions were made available to banks, which among other critical 
functions, provide the foundations of the payments system; to the primary dealers, which in 
March of 2008 were a group of 20 of the major banks and investment banks through which 
the Fed executed monetary policy and the U.S. Treasury funded the government; and to the 
government sponsored mortgage entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were critical 
to the housing finance system. 
 
The programs for funding markets were directed at preserving the functioning of the 
mortgage markets, commercial paper market, and the asset backed commercial paper 
market. (In addition to these programs which used only the Fed’s lending authority, we 
subsequently used a combination of the Fed and the Treasury’s emergency authority to 
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revive the asset backed securities markets, markets that were a source of funding for a range 
of consumer finance products from credit cards to auto loans). 
 
The arc of escalation went roughly like this: We started with banks and then expanded our 
lending programs to include the primary dealers, then moved to the GSEs, and then when 
other critical parts of the system were at risk of failure, we moved to backstop the key 
funding markets.  
 
Apart from the expanding scope of these programs, over time we also gradually increased 
the amount of risk we assumed, by extending the maturity of the loans (as in the case of the 
discount window and the Term Auction Facility (TAF), and expanding the range of collateral 
we lent against (as in the case of the emergency lending facility for the investment banks and 
securities affiliates of the major banks). The terms of the funding, in terms of the price and 
the haircuts, were designed to be attractive enough to be valuable in the crisis but expensive 
when conditions normalized so as to avoid prolonged use.  
  
This distinction between programs directed at institutions and markets, is somewhat 
artificial. The programs for the different funding markets obviously also provided critical 
support for the core institutions and helped improve their viability. 
 
These programs eventually covered much of the financial system, but they were not 
comprehensive. We had to decide, as will our successors in future crises, how to define the 
boundaries of these programs. How narrow or broad should be their reach?  
 
Our approach was to extend them to support only the most critical functions of the system, 
not every part of the financial system. We started with banks then moved to primary dealers, 
which were a defined class of institutions that were essential to the execution of monetary 
policy and the funding of the U.S. government and performed much of the capital-raising and 
market-making activities of the U.S. financial system. We did not establish broader funding 
programs for insurance companies or for other types of non-bank or specialty finance 
companies because we believed they were less critical to the stability of the financial system. 
We extended these programs to the broader funding markets when those markets stopped 
working well.  
  
The Fed’s generally available lender of last resort funding programs, although essential, were 
limited in what they could do. We didn’t fully appreciate the limits of their power until we 
got deeper into the crisis. But we knew enough to realize that, even when used creatively, 
they would leave a substantial amount of risk with the private markets, including equity 
investors in, and creditors to, financial institutions. They could mitigate a loss of funding, but 
they could not make up for a lack of adequate capital, and they did not have the force of a 
guarantee. They could help keep a viable firm liquid and functioning, but they had limited 
power in sustaining the weakest parts of the financial system. Ultimately it took a much 
broader mix of guarantees and capital injections—together with a powerful set of monetary 
policy action and fiscal stimulus—to prevent the collapse of the financial system.  
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At this initial phase of the crisis, we were not operating in a system where the executive 
branch had authority delegated by Congress to inject capital, provide broad guarantees, or 
nationalize parts of the system. How did we decide the boundaries that defined what the 
Federal Reserve should do and could not do?  There were no neat and clear lines, and this 
was contentious within the Fed. Many within the Fed argued that we should limit our actions 
to those necessary to protect the banking system and leave the rest of the challenges to the 
Congress and the Treasury. Some believe that in acting beyond those conventional limits we 
would risk damaging the Fed’s credibility, add to future moral hazard risk, or make it easier 
for Congress and the Executive Branch to delay. We shared those concerns, but Chairman 
Bernanke, his colleagues, and I decided it was important to use the authority we had, with 
increasingly novel and expansive interpretation of that authority. We believed we had the 
responsibility to act to try to keep the financial system liquid, even though that might mask 
the severity of the problem and for a time make it harder for the broader U.S. political system 
to recognize the need for additional action.  
6. Interventions for Specific Financial Institutions 
 
In addition to these broad funding programs for different classes of institution and funding 
markets, the Federal Reserve used its emergency authorities to provide additional support 
to individual institutions where we believed the failure of that institution would jeopardize 
the stability of the broader financial institution.  
 
We considered this in two different contexts, first for the major investment banks, second 
for AIG, and then for the auto finance companies.9 In deciding whether to use our emergency 
authority to help prevent the failure of an individual institution, we considered several 
different questions. 
 
Was the failure of the institution likely to be materially damaging to the stability of the core of 
the financial system and the overall economy?  
 
This assessment was a function of the firm’s size, the importance of its role in the funding 
and credit markets, its linkages with the rest of the financial system, and the contagion that 
might accompany its failure. The risk to the financial system was in turn a function of the 
state of the world at that moment in time. Failure of a large non-bank in a relatively stable 
world would matter less than the failure of even a more modest sized institution in a very 
fragile world. In 2008, Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and AIG all posed this risk. This 
of course was also the case for the major U.S. banks.  
  
                                                          
9 The Fed also used the 13(3) authority in the context of the later “ring fencing” arrangements for Citi and Bank 
of America. 
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In the event of failure that might cause systemic damage, did the Fed have the ability to contain 
the damage?  
 
Were the protections that could be provided by the broader provision of liquidity to the 
markets or through our general funding facilities powerful enough to contain the risk of a 
broader run? If so, then our first instinct was to not intervene to try to prevent the failure of 
the specific institution.  
 
How weak was the institution? 
 
If you are not required to determine solvency but should not lend to the nonviable, how 
should you decide? Since any severe funding problem will at least raise plausible doubt about 
viability, you can’t decide that illiquidity itself is disqualifying. That would render the lender 
of last resort meaningless. It would be like saying the Fed could lend only to those who don’t 
need it. To judge viability, you have to rely on other things that you can observe and evaluate, 
such as the relative degree of concern about the institution’s default risk and its equity value 
in comparison to similar institutions. In Lehman’s case, we had the evidence of the prolonged 
inability of Lehman to raise capital, to sell assets, to fund its real estate portfolio at values 
anywhere close to where it was carrying those assets, and the limited value other institutions 
attached to its various investment banking businesses. 
 
Would a loan against the full amount of available collateral prevent default?  
 
The emergency provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, by limiting the amount the Fed could 
lend to the value of the available security, were designed to limit the amount of risk the Fed 
could take and therefore limit the ability of the Fed to rescue institutions closer to the point 
of insolvency. If the assets and businesses of the institution had enough value to support a 
loan large enough to prevent failure, then the Fed could act on its own to prevent that failure. 
This was the case with AIG. In contrast, if the value of the assets held by the firm were not 
sufficient to support a loan large enough to allow it to continue to operate, then the Fed did 
not have the ability to act on its own to prevent that failure. In that later case, which was the 
case for the independent investment banks, the Fed could use its lending powers to help 
support the acquisition of a failing firm by another financial institution, as we did with Bear 
Stearns, but in the absence of a willing acquirer or another source of equity capital, the Fed’s 
emergency authority alone could not prevent failure.10  
                                                          
10 What determined the amount of support we could provide to help facilitate an acquisition? As we 
demonstrated in the case of the JPMorgan acquisition of Bear Stearns, we could lend against a portfolio of 
securities provided the we believed there was a reasonable chance that those assets would ultimately be worth 
enough to cover the value of the loan. Since we had a lower cost of funds and could hold the assets over time, 
through the recession, we could effectively value the assets at a higher level than might be possible by the 
acquiring institution or that the market as a whole might place on those assets during the crisis. This provided 
a potentially valuable incentive in facilitating a merger, but that value was limited by the constraint on the 
amount of risk we could take. If the gap between the value of the assets as marked on the books of the failing 
institution and the value the market ascribed to those assets was large, as in the case of Lehman, then we were 
unlikely to be able to close all of that gap.  
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How did we apply this broad framework in the case of the investment banks and AIG? 
 
With no resolution authority, and no ability to provide capital or guarantee liabilities for 
financial institutions that were not banks, the only tool we had available to prevent the 
failure of a major non-bank financial institution, until Congress passed the emergency 
legislation in October 2008, was the Federal Reserve’s authority. This authority was 
designed to reduce the chance that a relatively strong institution would become illiquid, but 
because the amount the Fed could lend was limited to the amount of collateral available, this 
authority could not ensure that the weakest could remain viable. The generally available 
funding facilities, the actions to prevent the failure of the GSEs, and the broader policy actions 
to limit the severity of the recession could all help to reduce the risk of failure of the major 
financial institutions, but they could only do so much.  
 
This meant that our ability to prevent the failure of a major non-bank depended on the value 
of its assets and the strength of its underlying businesses. If the assets and the firm’s capacity 
to generate income were sufficient to support a loan that was large enough to prevent failure, 
then the Fed’s authority could be used to prevent failure. Where those conditions did not 
apply, then our options were limited to trying to facilitate an acquisition of the failing firm 
by a stronger institution. We could facilitate an acquisition by lending against a portion of 
the assets of the failing firm, as we did in the Bear Stearns’ case and could potentially have 
done in the Lehman case, but we could not guarantee the obligations of the failing institution 
or inject capital. The presence of a viable buyer depended on the relative strength of the 
potential acquirers, the relative attractiveness of the businesses of the failing institutions, 
and a rough estimate of the value of its assets. If the failing institution was large, then by 
definition the universe of potential acquirers was limited, and this list narrowed as 
awareness of the potential severity of the crisis and the recession intensified. The weaker 
the failing institution, the less likely there would be a viable buyer.  
 
We viewed Bear Stearns and Lehman though essentially the same framework. Both were too 
weak to survive on their own. The failure of either, in the fragile conditions of that time, 
would have threatened the stability of the financial system. Both had a mix of existing assets 
and businesses that were not considered valuable enough by the markets to enable them on 
their own to withstand the losses on their balance sheets. Or to put it differently, estimates 
of potential losses were large enough relative to the equity value of the firms to raise 
substantial doubt in the market about the ability of both firms to survive as independent 
entities and to cover their obligations.  
 
In the case of Bear Stearns, when, together with the Treasury, we undertook the first real-
time exploration of our options to prevent the failure of an independent investment bank, 
we decided that Bear was too weak for us to be able to lend them enough money to survive. 
We made this judgment on the basis of what we could observe in the market, what we 
learned about Bear’s businesses and assets on Thursday night and into the weekend as we 
were able to examine its books, and by the reactions of the potential acquirers that weekend 
as they considered providing capital to or acquiring the firm.  
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All this confirmed our belief that the firm did not have assets of enough value to “secure to 
[our] satisfaction” a loan large enough to enable it to survive on its own. Although we agreed 
to a short term loan to get them to the weekend, we thought to lend into the run would simply 
finance the exit of Bear’s existing creditors, while the businesses eroded, along with the 
ultimate value of the firm.  
 
When we decided we did not have the ability on our own to prevent Bear from failing, we 
were left with two options: (1) to help facilitate the acquisition of Bear by another financial 
institution; and (2) to put in place funding facility to help backstop the remaining four 
independent investment banks. We chose to do both.  
 
When JPMorgan first proposed that the Federal Reserve assume some of the risk in 
preventing Bear’s failure, our initial response, given the exceptional nature of such a step 
and the risks involved, was to propose that the Treasury provide a guarantee against any 
losses the Fed might face. Secretary Paulson, after consulting the Treasury General Counsel, 
determined the Treasury had no authority to provide such a guarantee.  
 
While we were engaged in this discussion about Treasury’s authority, we took a closer look 
at the $30 billion portfolio of Bear’s assets which JPMorgan was proposing to leave with us. 
Our assessment was that, although there was a chance that in a severe crisis we could lose 
money, it seemed likely that we could earn a positive return if we held the portfolio through 
the recession. The expected value of the portfolio was slightly positive, allowing us to believe 
we could meet the condition in the Federal Reserve Act that we could be “secured to our 
satisfaction.” We could have been wrong in either direction. The fact that two-thirds of the 
portfolio was composed of securities backed by Fannie and Freddie was important to this 
judgment, though of course it would ultimately require substantial government resources to 
ensure that Fannie and Freddie could meet their obligations.  
 
This portfolio entailed a modest amount of risk to the Fed. Despite the limited risk to us, this 
was valuable to JPMorgan because the capital charge associated with holding those assets 
would have absorbed some of the cushion remaining on both its risk weighted and total 
capital ratios. This was important because the roughly one-third of the portfolio that was 
considered relatively low risk to us—the securities whose underlying risk was backed by 
Fannie and Freddie—would still have counted against JPMorgan’s total (non-risk weighted) 
capital ratio. 
 
We asked Secretary Paulson to write us a letter conveying his view that acting to help 
prevent the failure of Bear was important to the stability of the financial system and 
recognizing that any loss born by the Federal Reserve would ultimately be borne by the U.S. 
taxpayer. In effect, we established the expectation that if the Fed were to undertake a similar 
action in a future case we would ask for a similar statement of support from the Treasury 
Secretary.   
 
The events of that weekend in March 2008 had an important impact on how we approached 
the events of September.  
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There had been very few interested buyers for Bear, in part because of concerns about the 
weakness of Bear’s businesses, in part because of the very short time frame in which they 
had to act, in part because of its size (even though it was the smallest of the independent 
investment banks), and in part because the universe of firms strong enough to be viable 
buyers were worried about taking on more risk as the crisis intensified.  
 
In the weeks following the merger announcement, despite the fact that JPMorgan agreed to 
stand behind all of Bear’s remaining obligations, Bear continued to lose funding and business 
in part because of uncertainty about whether the merger would be approved by Bear’s 
shareholders. And, despite our decision to help prevent Bear’s failure and to lend directly to 
the remaining independent investment banks, funding conditions for the major investment 
banks, particularly Lehman, continued to erode in the weeks and months that followed.  
 
In invoking the Fed’s emergency authorities that March, we crossed a line that had not been 
crossed since the Great Depression. We had discussed the risk that our actions that weekend 
in March might provide false comfort to the management of and the creditors to the 
remaining investment banks. To create the impression of support without the capacity to 
provide that support was a consequential step.11 We decided that the benefits of acting to try 
to contain the growing crisis justified that risk. And we spent the weeks and months that 
followed in a concerted effort to reduce the odds of a more severe crisis. These actions 
included: a joint effort by the FRBNY and the SEC to force the major investment banks to 
reduce their vulnerability to further erosions in market funding; a sustained though 
unsuccessful effort together with Secretary Paulson to get Lehman to raise additional capital 
or merge with a stronger institution; Secretary Paulson’s successful efforts to convince 
Congress to pass legislation to intervene to, in effect, guarantee the viability of Fannie and 
Freddie; continuing effort by the Fed to place the tri-party repo and derivatives markets on 
a more stable footing; and effort by Treasury and Fed staff to draft a framework for 
additional emergency legislation that would provide authority to inject capital into 
individual financial institutions, purchase assets, and “resolve” large failing investment 
banks and other financial institutions. 
 
Bernanke, Paulson, and I had decided in March that the system was too fragile to contain the 
potential fallout from default by a relatively small investment bank. The rest of the financial 
system remained very fragile. Congress provided the authority to prevent the failure of 
Fannie and Freddie, but was not prepared to act on additional authority over the course of 
the summer.12 As a result, even as the probability of failures of other large non-bank financial 
institutions increased over the course of the summer, our limited tools for preventing them 
had not changed.    
 
                                                          
11 Bagehot had warned about such a risk in writing, “To lend a great deal, and yet not give the public confidence 
that you will lend sufficiently and effectually, is the worst of all policies….” Thanks to David Wessel for this 
quotation and for reminding me of the richness of Bagehot’s various admonitions. (See Bagehot 1873). 
 
12 While deliberating the early drafts of TARP legislation, Barney Frank said to Hank Paulson “We want to adopt 
something that works, but there is resistance within our caucuses.” (Paulson 2010). 
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Lehman was similar to Bear in the challenges it presented us but different in several respects. 
It was larger. It was widely perceived to have a substantially greater magnitude of losses. 
Because of its size, the perceived attractiveness of its various businesses relative to its 
competitors, and its risks, Lehman, even in a more stable world, would have had a smaller 
universe of potential buyers. That universe was even smaller given the fact that the risks of 
a deep recession and a more severe crisis were much greater in early September than they 
had been in March. 
 
Lehman’s position was perilous in part because of the approach it had adopted over the 
course of the summer. In trying to raise capital, it had opened its books to a broad universe 
of potential investors and partners. This process of selective disclosure did not increase 
confidence. And Lehman’s decision to raise a relatively small amount of capital and not from 
a strategic investor with a stronger balance sheet left it very vulnerable. 
 
Going into the weekend of September 13, we hoped we could help facilitate a merger, like 
we had with Bear and JPMorgan13, or convince a consortium of the world’s major financial 
institutions to either help prevent a disorderly failure as Bill McDonough had ten years 
earlier with LTCM, or to assume some of the risk in facilitating a merger. There was no 
support for the LTCM option, but we told the two potential acquirers of Lehman that we were 
willing to help make it possible for them to leave some of Lehman’s assets behind. And we 
made the case to the major banks that it was in their best interest to fund a special purpose 
vehicle that would take the unwanted assets. We considered this as a potential substitute for 
what we had done with JPMorgan in the Bear acquisition, or as a supplementary source of 
financing from the Fed for any deal that could be negotiated.  
 
The events over that weekend gave us a range of additional insight into the potential size of 
the losses in Lehman’s assets and the potential value of its various businesses. The market 
had long suspected that Lehman had been overvaluing its assets and, beginning in the spring 
of 2008, certain investors had begun to go public with their concerns.14 
 
Our initial impression, reinforced over the course of the weekend, was that the economic risk 
in Lehman's pool of assets was substantially larger than the Bear portfolio, and that the 
financial institutions that were most likely to find value in Lehman’s businesses did not 
believe that those businesses had sufficient value relative to the significant risks.  
 
The largest and most contested valuations involved Lehman’s real estate holdings. Following 
its failure over the summer to secure a buyer or provider of capital, Lehman announced on 
September 10 a plan to spin off $30 billion of its most risky assets into a separate company, 
nicknamed “SpinCo,” leaving the “clean Lehman” to be recapitalized. The market was not 
willing to acquire these assets at anything close to what Lehman was hoping to receive. It 
                                                          
13 See BusinessWire (2008) for the press release announcing the details of the JPMorgan Chase Bear Stearns 
merger. 
 
14 The actions in early September, to put the GSE’s into conservatorship and other announcements by the firm, 
were followed by a new wave of pressure on Lehman, as investors became more concerned about the scale of 
potential real estate losses ahead and the vulnerability of other firms to those losses. (See FCIC 2011). 
19
Reflections on the Lender of Last Resort Geithner
could not sell them at the market price without taking losses that would have been fatal given 
the erosion in its equity value. Lehman’s stock fell further, bringing it closer to the edge of 
the abyss by the end of that week. (Smith 2008). 
 
Over the course of the weekend, Lehman’s potential suitors cast further doubt about the 
value of Lehman’s assets. BoA’s rough estimate, based on data from Lehman itself, was that 
Lehman had $60-$70 billion of assets marked well above what they were likely to be worth. 
This was surely an opening bid in a negotiation, but it also provided a measure of the extent 
of Lehman's losses and the relative weaknesses of its businesses.  
 
Barclays was interested, too, but it made it clear from the beginning that it would not 
consider acquiring Lehman unless it could leave behind a large pool of assets that Lehman 
had valued at roughly $50 billion. (Paulson 2010) (Sorkin 2009) (Wessel 2009). 
 
Alongside these discussions with potential buyers, we tasked a group of other bankers with 
the job of valuing the firm’s assets. On Saturday, the group estimated that Lehman had 
overvalued its $58 billion in real estate assets by close to fifty percent and that its private 
equity valuations were also highly questionable. (FRBNY 2008). Those banks might also have 
had an interest in overestimating those losses since they were aware we might ask them to 
assume some or all of that risk. But, in any event, all agreed that overvaluations by Lehman—
and associated potential losses—were substantial.  
 
By Saturday afternoon, BoA had decided Lehman’s capital hole was too deep and that it was 
more fragile and less valuable than Merrill. In contrast to Lehman, which BoA said it would 
not consider buying without being able to leave behind those $60 billion of the riskiest 
assets, BoA agreed to pay $50 billion to acquire all of Merrill’s assets and liabilities without 
the Fed assuming any of the risk.  
 
Barclays was then left as the only potential buyer for Lehman, but on the condition that it 
could leave behind a substantial pool of the riskiest assets, which the private consortium had 
tentatively agreed to fund. When the British regulators refused to waive a London Stock 
Exchange requirement that Barclay’s shareholders approve an open-ended guarantee of 
Lehman’s trading book during the pre-closing period, which would have entailed a 
dangerous 30-60 days of uncertainty, Barclay’s asked whether the Fed would provide a full 
guarantee of Lehman’s trading book.  
  
 
We considered whether we could do so, but our lawyers determined that the Fed had no 
legal ability to provide such a guarantee.15 Although the British authorities did not say it 
explicitly to us at the time, they made it clear in accounts written after the crisis that, at the 
                                                          
15 Although in this instance, the financing had been secured by the private consortium’s agreement to fund Lehman’s 
real estate assets, the guarantee was still critical to forestall a run between signing and closing. Barclay’s could not 
guarantee Lehman’s trading book without a shareholder vote and the Fed had no authority to issue an open-ended and 
unsecured guarantee. See Baxter (2010a) regarding the importance of a third-party guarantee of Lehman’s operations 
and the likely negative prognosis for the company without one.  
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time, they deemed Lehman too close to insolvency to risk burdening an already weak 
Barclays. They interpreted our indications that we could not provide a guarantee as further 
indication that Lehman was too weak. They did not want to import the “American cancer.” 
(Paulson 2010).  
 
With Barclays out of the picture, and no other interested buyer on the horizon, we were out 
of options to prevent Lehman’s failure.16 Just as we had concluded with Bear, our judgment 
regarding Lehman was that the combination of the fragility of its businesses and the scale of 
losses in its assets meant that we could not provide them a loan large enough to save them. 
To lend on that scale, we believed, would not have been effective and would have been 
outside any reasonable interpretation of the scope of our emergency authority.17  
 
As in the case of Bear, we believed that lending into the ongoing run would just finance the 
exit of other creditors, fail to arrest the collapse in confidence in the institution, and erode 
the ultimate value left for the rest of the creditors, all without improving the odds that a 
viable buyer would emerge. The company’s unsuccessful efforts over the previous six 
months to attract a suitor or raise sufficient capital, the market’s perception of the extent of 
the financial weakness of Lehman,18 combined with the intensity of the pressures on the rest 
of the financial system, meant to us that a strategy of lending to buy time would not work. 
Because we could not inject capital into the firm or guarantee its liabilities and had no ability 
to run the type of “resolution” or quasi bankruptcy process the FDIC had the authority to use 
for banks, we were out of options to prevent Lehman’s failure.19  
                                                          
16 We coordinated with the SEC to devise a “Plan B” in this event. The plan was to have the broker-dealer, their 
main U.S. operating entity, continue to operate with funding from the Fed to wind down its book, since, at a 
smaller size, a SIPC proceeding would be more orderly. And this is essentially what happened with the SIPC 
proceeding commencing on September 19, helped along by Barclay’s acquisition of most of the firm’s assets.  
 
17 As noted above, although we did not believe we had the legal ability to save all of Lehman on our own, we did 
have the ability to lend against the collateral they held in their U.S. broker-dealer which had not been included 
the parent’s bankruptcy filing. We did lend to the broker-dealer on a substantial scale after the holding 
company filed for bankruptcy to help reduce the risk of a larger, immediate liquidation.  
 
18 Even ten years after its bankruptcy there is no consensus regarding Lehman’s solvency or the size of its capital 
hole. Anton Valukas, the court-appointed bankruptcy examiner determined after extensive analysis and 
assistance from advisors, that “[u]tilizing a market‐based approach” there was “sufficient evidence to support 
a finding of insolvency of LBHI [the parent company] beginning on September 8, 2008,” and perhaps as early 
as September 2nd (Valukas 2010, 1973). Duff and Phelps who looked at Lehman’s assets for the bankruptcy 
examiner, determined on an implied asset value basis that Lehman was insolvent on various days during the 
summer 2008 and valued its net worth at approximately -$35 billion immediately before its bankruptcy filing 
(Valukas 2010, 1578-80). Also see Ibid. Appendix No. 21: LBHI Insolvency Analysis for more detail). The FDIC, 
in considering the hypothetical application of its new orderly resolution process for non-bank institutions 
calculated it as -$5 billion. (FDIC 2011).  The estimates of others have also varied widely. Even Ball (2016), who 
has vigorously criticized our actions (or inaction) calculated Lehman’s net worth between -$2 billion and $13 
billion (assuming its subordinated debt would not be wiped out). Notably, Cline and Gagnon (2013) reached 
the largest estimate at -$100 billion to -$200 billion. 
19 In responding to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Chairman Bernanke expounded on our reasoning—
“the credit relied on by Lehman to remain in operation was in the hundreds of billions of dollars and the lack 
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Even if we could not prevent failure, the law gave us the ability to lend to an institution or an 
affiliate of an institution that might be on the edge of failure to allow time for a more orderly 
liquidation, but only to the extent we had security sufficient to cover the value of our loan.20  
We were able to act to help prevent a precipitous liquidation of the broker-dealer because 
Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer affiliate was much smaller than the firm as a whole, its liquidity 
needs were smaller, and we concluded that the value of the collateral held in that entity was 
sufficient to cover its immediate funding needs. The funding that we provided to the broker-
dealer under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and other facilities after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy filing meant that this smaller entity could continue to close out its trades for a 
few more days, shrinking the firm and moving towards a more orderly liquidation.21  
 
Some have contended that Lehman was nominally solvent and therefore we could have lent 
it enough money for it to survive. As discussed earlier, the absence of an explicit solvency 
test in the Federal Reserve Act does not mean that the lending tools should or could be used 
to sustain firms that are not viable. To lend freely to the nonviable carries many risks. 
Moreover, a simple crude “solvency” test by itself, even if such tests were feasible during a 
panic, is not an adequate basis for a decision to lend.  
 
                                                          
of confidence that led counterparties to pull away from Lehman suggested that Lehman would need a credit 
backstop of all its obligations in order to prevent a debilitating run by its counterparties. Moreover, the value 
of a substantial portion of assets held by Lehman, especially its investments in RMBS, loans, and real estate, 
was falling significantly. Derivative positions were subject to continuing collateral calls that required amounts 
of Lehman funding that could not easily be quantified in advance. And clearing parties were demanding 
collateral as a condition for serving as an intermediary in transactions with Lehman. We saw no evidence that 
Lehman had sufficient collateral to support these types and amounts of taxpayer support from the Federal 
Reserve […] Moreover, without a potential buyer for Lehman, the Federal Reserve could not be certain how 
long it would be required to fund Lehman or what the ultimate source of repayment, if any, would have been.” 
(Bernanke 2010).  
 
Baxter (2010a) asserts the importance of a third-party guarantee of Lehman’s operations and the likely 
negative prognosis for the company without one.  
 
20 Baxter improves on this formulation, explaining that “to be secured to our satisfaction” traditionally required 
that we have a “first priority perfected security interest in eligible collateral with a lendable value [after a 
haircut] which exceeds the amount of the credit extended”−to provide some margin of safety that would be 
greater than or equal to the amount lent. (Anand 2016). 
 
21 Lehman’s broker-dealer borrowed under the PDCF but was subject to two additional terms that took into 
consideration its unique situation that its parent would be in bankruptcy-(i) steeper haircuts and (ii) the need 
to certify that assets pledged to the PDCF by LBI on September 15th had been owned by it on September 12th 
and not transferred to it by the parent after that date. (Baxter 2010b). We did not “cut off” the Lehman parent 
from borrowing from the PDFC, as some critics have stated. The holding company was never eligible to borrow 
from the facility, nor was any other parent of a primary dealer. (Ibid.). The broker-dealer borrowed between 
$40 and $60 billion a day, across 3 different facilities: the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the PDCF, 
and the Open Market Operations from September 15 through September 18, 2008. (A repo is functionally a 
secured loan). (Ibid., Valukas 2010, 1536).  
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Even using a generous view of the value of Lehman’s assets, the losses were in the range of 
tens of billions of dollars.  
 
Of the firm’s roughly $600 billion in liabilities, only about a fifth was long-term subordinated 
debt, and thus not runnable. Absent a legal resolution or bankruptcy regime, we could not 
magically turn that long-term debt into equity to absorb the losses. The rest of the liabilities 
might bleed away, some quickly, some slowly.  
 
If we had been willing to commit to lend hundreds of billions of dollars to cover all the 
liabilities, or even “just” the $500 billion that were not long-term subordinated debt, would 
that have that been effective in making the firm viable? That seems extremely unlikely.  
 
If the Fed had assumed all the risk in lending to Lehman, and we had to replace the holders 
of $500 billion of runnable debt, would we have been able to capture the remaining value in 
Lehman’s assets and businesses ahead of the other claimants to those assets, and would that 
value be sufficient to cover our exposure? In the extreme case, the Fed would be the holder 
of assets previously valued at $600 billion but now worth substantially less, having paid out 
the $500 billion of Lehman’s other obligations and with the core business of the bank deeply 
damaged. That would then become a liquidation exercise, with uncertain remaining assets 
to back our claims and the claims of the $100 billion of long-term debt holders. Of course, in 
reality, many of Lehman’s assets were already encumbered, and there was no reliable way 
to estimate the value of the rest.  
 
We were willing to take substantial risk, as we decided to do roughly a day and a half later in 
the loan to AIG. In the case of AIG, however, we believed there was a reasonable chance that 
AIG’s assets in the form of its insurance businesses around the world were stable enough 
and valuable enough to support a loan large enough to prevent default. Even in that case, 
however, the Fed had to increase the total size of its commitment and Treasury had to inject 
capital bringing the total commitment by the government to $185 billion before things 
stabilized. Ultimately, the underlying businesses proved quite resilient and profitable, and 
the tax-payer earned a profit of $23 billion on that package of assistance.  
 
In the Lehman case, without a willing buyer and without access to a resolution regime like 
the FDIC’s regime for banks, we believed that to lend on a scale necessary to save it would 
be outside the limits of what we could do. The limits on the amount we could lend rendered 
the tool inadequate to the challenge of preventing the failure of an investment bank in the 
process of a run. To lend in that context would have been a proverbial bridge to nowhere. 
 
Would a loan to buy time have been helpful in limiting the damage, even if it simply delayed 
rather than prevented failure?  
 
Perhaps, but I think this is unlikely. We saw in the Bear case how funding continued to bleed 
away and Bear’s businesses continued to erode, even after JPMorgan announced the 
commitment to acquire Bear. That changed only with a fully credible guarantee from 
JPMorgan, but at that point a lot of damage had been done. To lend ineffectively, without 
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stabilizing the firm and without credibility preventing failure, would not have been 
reassuring to a market at the edge of panic.  
 
Of course the central bank should be prepared to take losses. In fact, it is highly likely given 
all the risk and uncertainty in panics that the appropriate use of the lender of last resort 
authority might well result in some losses. The greater the risk of contagion from default, the 
more risk a central bank should be prepared to take. But that is not an argument for lending 
freely to the nonviable, even in a panic. 
 
Some suggest that if we had been willing to commit earlier to lend against a large pool of 
Lehman’s riskiest assets that we would have encouraged more firms to come forward as 
potential buyers of the rest of the firm. This is possible, but not likely, given the magnitude 
of the risky assets Lehman held, the limits on what the Fed could lend against, and the general 
weakness of the universe of Lehman's potential acquirers. The fact that no other willing 
buyer came forward in the summer or that weekend with a credible ability to absorb 
Lehman, even with the prospect of an arrangement like JPMorgan’s with Bear, illustrated the 
limits of what was possible.   
 
Is it possible that if we had lent to investment banks earlier and more generously starting in 
the summer of 2007, that we could have diffused the risk of the panic before it spread far and 
wide?  
 
For this to have been sufficient you would have to believe that the weakest of the investment 
banks were still viable, solvent but illiquid, and simply victims of broader forces beyond their 
control. There is little basis for believing this. In early 2008, Lehman and Bear reported total 
assets of roughly 33 times their common equity.22 Both firms had funded those assets with 
short-term obligations, the type of funding most likely to run when things got scary, which 
is exactly what happened. They ran businesses that seemed viable and profitable in a boom, 
when liquidity was cheap and available, but were not designed to withstand a less benign 
environment. They were too late to recognize this reality and to adjust course.  
 
Confidence in Lehman eroded dramatically in the weeks after Bear’s near failure in March 
2008, even though we had established the PDCF to provide backup liquidity to the 
investment banks in the event that they experienced a situation similar to Bear.23 In 
September, confidence eroded in Goldman and Morgan Stanley, even after we expanded the 
terms of that facility on the Sunday night of Lehman’s failure to accept any type of security 
that could have been used in the tri-party repo market, including collateral located overseas, 
thus providing a fuller backstop for funding that ran from any part of the firms.  
 
                                                          
22 See Lehman Brothers’ SEC Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 (Lehman Brothers 2008) and Bear 
Stearns’ report for the same period. (Bear Stearns 2008). 
 
23 We had also established the TSLF which accepted securities that could no longer be used as collateral in the 
repo market and exchanged then for Treasuries which the firm could still borrow against. (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve Website). 
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A variant of this argument—that if we had deployed our existing authorities sooner and 
more aggressively, things would have been different—is that if we had agreed to allow all 
investment banks to convert to bank holding companies earlier, they would have been able 
to benefit from the halo effect of Fed support and would have survived. We can’t fully know 
the answer to this, but the balance of evidence doesn't support that judgment.  
 
Lehman had asked late in the summer whether we would consider making them a bank 
holding company on the theory that it would give the impression of greater access to funding 
from the Fed. Given the erosion in Lehman’s financial position, we did not think that would 
be effective, in part because it wouldn’t in practice materially change the degree of funding 
from the Fed, and to create the perception of protection without the reality would be 
ineffective.  
 
After Lehman’s failure, the Fed did agree to make Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs bank 
holding companies on September 21, but only on the condition that they raise a substantial 
amount of outside capital from private sources. They were able to do this, but even with that 
additional equity capital, and even after giving the market the impression that Morgan and 
Goldman were more securely under the Fed’s protection, both banks remained perilously 
close to failure until, using the newly granted authority of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, Treasury injected capital into them, and they were able to issue new debt 
with a full FDIC guarantee. (Dealbook 2008). (Geithner 2014). (Avraham, Selvaggi, and 
Vickery 2012).  
 
Was Lehman the cause of the broader panic, or was it more the symptom of the broader forces 
that caused the panic?  
 
Because of Lehman’s size and the timing of its failure, many people believe that Lehman was 
the cause of the panic that followed. Although the initial market reaction to Lehman’s failure 
was limited, conditions deteriorated rapidly over the course of the next several days. 
Lehman’s default led to the Reserve Primary Fund’s decision to “break the buck” as a result 
of significant losses in Lehman commercial paper. The Reserve Primary Fund’s “breaking the 
buck” led to a general run on prime money market funds. Money market funds withdrew 
funding from other investment banks, non-bank financial institutions, and other foreign 
banks. The actions by the Lehman administrator in London to seize collateral in prime 
brokerage accounts led to a general flight by hedge funds and other financial firms from 
other investment banks and broker-dealers. Lehman’s failure and AIG’s near failure, both 
coming soon after the actions to put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, raised the 
probability of failure of other financial institutions. The crisis spread later that week to the 
weakest of the major U.S. banks, WAMU and Wachovia. 
 
We hoped the damage would be less severe, given how much time the markets had to 
prepare for failure, but we feared it would be terrible. 24 Lehman’s bankruptcy obviously 
                                                          
24 The progressive erosion in Lehman’s financial position over the course of the summer was in effect the 
impact of its counterparties and investors preparing for the possibilities it would not survive. (See FCIC 2011). 
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made a fragile situation worse, but its failure was more a symptom of the broader breakdown 
of the financial system than the fundamental cause of that breakdown. The financial system 
had already been experiencing a slow, less visible run for more than a year. The much larger 
AIG, Fannie and Freddie, and Merrill Lynch had all arrived at the edge of collapse at roughly 
the same time as Lehman, not as a result of Lehman’s failure.  
 
A common framework people use in trying to understand crises is that of dominoes or 
contagion. But the agent of causality in a systemic financial crisis is rarely the direct losses 
caused by a large failure. Ed Lazear’s preferred metaphor is of popcorn on a stove or in a 
microwave. The growing heat, a reflection of the intensifying recession, causes the popcorn 
to pop, and then more firms to fail.  
 
This is closer to reality than the domino or contagion metaphors of crisis, but it’s not quite 
right. The better explanation is that as the scale of losses, actual and expected, increase, more 
institutions are pushed closer to the edge of collapse. The market, not able to differentiate 
fully, pulls back from all that look potentially vulnerable. The failure of one raises the implied 
probability of the failure of other firms considered similarly exposed to losses from a 
deepening recession.   
 
When market participants cannot discern the scope of the official safety net, in terms of the 
types of institutions that fall within it, or they do not understand the limits of that safety net 
in preventing failure, then the chances are greater that panic escalates with the unexpected 
failure. In this sense, an important consequence of Lehman’s failure was that it changed 
beliefs about what type of institution the Fed and the government had the power or the 
intention to save. This mattered at the time, but it was not the most important effect. The 
crisis intensified after Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship, and it 
intensified after the Fed announced it would lend to AIG, although both actions prevented 
default and dramatically limited the losses on the broader financial system. By highlighting 
the fragility of some of the largest financial institutions in the world, each of which had been 
rated among the safest of any of the major financial institutions, the fact that the government 
and the central bank had to intervene to prevent their failure eroded confidence in the rest 
of the financial system.   
7. Lessons from This Phase of the Financial Crisis. 
 
This phase of the crisis from the late winter to the early fall of 2008 offers some important 
lessons for the design of financial systems and for crisis management. 
 
Perhaps most important, it illustrates the dangers of allowing the prudential safeguards to 
erode and allowing financial systems to evolve beyond the perimeter of the prudential 
constraints. In any risk-based capital system, a long period of relative stability will reduce 
estimates of future losses and erode the protection provided by the capital regime. If you 
wait too long to remedy this, you will lose the chance to force institutions to raise private 
capital, and place more of the ultimate burden for the rescue on the taxpayer. If you allow 
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firms to issue deposit-like, “safe” liabilities and to engage in maturity transformation in 
competition with banks but without being constrained by limitations on leverage and 
funding, then over time the market share of the more easily defended parts of the system 
will decline, and the relative size of the rest of the system will expand. In the extreme crisis, 
the overall financial system will be fragile and harder to stabilize, with greater damage to the 
economy.  
 
A second painful lesson from this phase of the crisis is the dangers of running a financial 
system with an outdated and limited arsenal of financial tools.  
 
Lending facilities are an inadequate defense against financial panics. To make it more likely 
that the financial authorities are able to avoid the savage economic damage of extreme crises, 
they need to be equipped with the ability to guarantee liabilities, inject capital, and to manage 
the failure of large institutions through resolution authority, conservatorship, or 
nationalization. If those tools are not available or require legislation in the moment, then the 
odds of a more severe crisis are much greater.  
 
The mix of funding, guarantees, and capital that were essential in the last financial crisis will 
be as important in future financial crises. The absence of any one of these tools cannot 
practically be compensated for by the presence of the others. The tools of the lender of last 
resort are not alchemy. Liquidity support alone is a poor substitute for capital. There’s no 
realistic amount of liquidity that can fully reassure creditors in a panic. The typical lending 
facilities of central banks, lending against collateral with a haircut to market value to provide 
a margin of protection, cannot provide protection equivalent to an explicit guarantee.  
 
A market where prices reflect fire-sales induced by runs can make in the more conservative 
capital buffers of today perilously thin. In the absence of an effective mix of monetary policy 
to lower interest rates and fiscal policy to help offset the risk of collapse in private demand, 
even substantial amounts of capital and funding protections can be overwhelmed.  
 
The perimeter of the safety net in a crisis has to be broad enough to cover the core of the 
financial system, even if parts of the financial system lie outside the scope of the formal 
perimeter of prudential regulations.  
 
And to be effective, a great deal of freedom and discretion in how to use this arsenal of tools 
is needed, ideally with some independence from the inevitable pressures of politics, given 
the fog of uncertainty that prevails in a crisis, the speed with which things can shift to panic, 
and the need for experimentation and adaptation as events develop.  
 
A credible arsenal has to be able to manage the full spectrum of crises, from the idiosyncratic 
to the systemic. The responses necessary to confront the full continuum of bad things that 
can happen are very different.  
 
This phase of the crisis also offers some important lessons for crisis management.  
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No plan survives first contact with the messy uncertainty of a systemic financial crisis. The 
dynamics of contagion are not predictable. There is no bright line between the insolvent and 
the merely illiquid, and therefore no purely objective, well-established set of rules for triage 
among firms. There is no clearly visible threshold between a necessary adjustment in asset 
values and a few failures of financial firms, and a full-scale financial panic.  
 
We have and we will inevitably in the future experience a wide variety of financial shocks, 
from the relatively benign to the extreme, from the idiosyncratic to the systemic. They 
require different solutions. The basic strategy that makes sense in most crises is different 
from what is necessary in a broader panic. What is conventionally indicated in dealing with 
banks that are failing for idiosyncratic reasons will, in conditions where the system is fragile, 
make panics worse. Failures of the weak and losses imposed on creditors, normally a good 
and necessary thing, can be too much of a good thing when the system itself is subject to 
failure.  
 
In a fragile financial system, where solvency is in question, the failure of even relatively 
modestly sized institutions can lead to runs on the relatively strong, because of the difficultly 
in knowing the severity of losses relative to capital in similar institutions. Default by one will 
raise estimates of the probability of default by others.  
  
Market expectations of the scope and flexibility of official support play an important part in 
the dynamics of runs, as do market expectations about the treatment of creditors.  
 
In panics, the core challenge is to reduce the incentive for creditors to run and for financial 
institutions to withdraw credit from the economy en masse. Policy should be directed at that 
objective, or you risk setting in motion the incendiary forces that can produce economic 
depressions. It is hard to know in the moment how vulnerable the system is to panic and 
runs. You may not know it unless/until you are in midst of the run. You have to feel your way, 
allowing adjustment and failure, weighing and assessing and trying things until you come to 
the point where you believe the core of the financial system is in jeopardy. This diagnostic 
challenge is central to the problem of designing strategy in a crisis.  
 
If you have full degrees of freedom in terms of the emergency arsenal of financial tools, and 
the conditions suggest substantial risk of panic, then you want to err on the side of being 
aggressive sooner in providing credible protection against the catastrophic risk. That is a 
function only governments and central banks can provide. To do this requires clear 
expectations around the extent and limits of the reach of the safety net, recognizing the limits 
of what the lender of last resort authority alone can do, and providing the full complement 
of backstop and guarantees that are necessary to definitively arrest a run. The focus should 
be on preserving broader market functioning, and protecting the stability of the essential 
core of the financial system, not in preventing the failures of individual firms at the weakest 
end of the solvency continuum. If you have an arsenal of tools to prevent/contain contagion 
and panic, then you can more safely allow the failure of the weakest.   
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8. An Assessment of the Emergency Authorities Going Forward: 
Where Do We Stand Today? 
 
The Prudential Defenses Are Much Stronger 
 
The post-crisis financial reforms in the U.S. include much more conservative constraints on 
risk taking, with tougher capital and liquidity requirements. These are applied across a much 
larger part of the financial system. The largest institutions, whose failure would be more 
damaging, are subject to tougher constraints relative to risk than smaller banks. Stress 
testing is an integral part of the new capital regime. The higher capital requirements will 
provide protection against more extreme losses and a much greater range of potential crises.  
 
To a much greater degree than before the crisis, the capital regulations are supplemented by 
requirements for more conservative funding. These new prudential regulations can be 
extended beyond the banking system to other institutions. The limitations on individual 
institutions are complemented by clearer authority to establish margin requirements in repo 
and derivatives.  
The structure of the U.S. financial system, however, still allows more opportunities for 
arbitrage around these constraints, and banks are a smaller share of the U.S. financial system 
than of the other major economies. Although substantially more conservative than the pre-
crisis regulations, they were not designed to provide protection against the most extreme 
crisis. Losses in the latest recession were high, but they would have been much higher 
without the forceful use of monetary policy and fiscal policy. It will take a long period of good 
policy choices and benign economic conditions for the Keynesian arsenal to be restored to 
the level where it could provide the same forceful response as in this past crisis. Over time, 
if we have another extended period of relatively stable economic conditions as in the period 
before this crisis—the “Great Moderation”—markets will again be willing to finance a 
substantial amount of maturity transformation with leverage outside the banking system, 
and this process will erode these protections.  
 
The Emergency Arsenal is Weaker.  
 
The financial reforms have left the U.S. with a weaker emergency arsenal relative to most 
other major economies. On the positive side, the new resolution regime combined with much 
higher total-loss-absorbing capital requirements provide better tools for managing the 
failure of a major investment bank like Lehman in a less messy way than default and 
liquidation. On the negative side, many of the tools that were essential to resolve this crisis 
have been eliminated or curtailed.  
 
The FDIC’s ability to guarantee the broader liabilities of large complex bank holding 
companies has been limited and now requires Congressional authorization.  
 
The Treasury’s ability to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee money market 
funds has been eliminated.  
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The Fed’s emergency lending authorities have been curtailed. The Fed can no longer use the 
provisions of 13(3) to lend to a single institution as we did to facilitate the acquisition of Bear 
Stearns and to prevent the failure of AIG. These provisions can still be used to lend to a broad 
class of institutions, like we did for the primary dealers, or important funding markets, like 
the commercial paper markets. New disclosure requirements may make it less likely that 
eligible institutions will make use of these authorities because of stigma, which will limit 
their value at the point when they are most important.  
 
The new resolution authority provides an elegantly designed solution to help limit the 
damage caused by the failure of a large complex financial institution, by limiting the scope of 
default to the obligations of the parent, allowing the operating subsidiaries, such as the banks 
and broker dealers underneath the parent, to continue to operate, and ensuring funding for 
the resolution would be available (the ultimate costs of which would be borne by the banking 
industry not the taxpayer). The new regime also allows for a brief stay on derivatives and 
other financial contracts. And by allowing the FDIC to leave behind the long term debt 
obligations of the parent to absorb losses, it creates a larger cushion of contingent equity 
ahead of the deposit insurance fund.  
 
For institutions that are subject to the much higher capital requirements, this is a very 
promising approach for managing a large failure. We won’t know how effective this will be 
until it is used. And with all its promise, it has some essential limitations.  
 
Although it provides a potentially effective way to deal with the idiosyncratic crisis, the 
failure of a large institution in an otherwise relatively stable system, it was not designed for 
the systemic financial crisis, where the number of institutions at risk of failure is large, and 
the system is at the edge of panic. As we saw in 2008, interventions to prevent default by a 
large institution could still increase fears of the failure of others. And, as we also saw in 2008, 
imposing losses on the creditors of a bank in a crisis will tend to broaden and accelerate the 
run.  
 
The scope of the higher capital requirements is not comprehensive and does not apply to 
significant parts of the banking system or to non-bank financial institutions. Resolution 
authority applied to these institutions would very likely entail default on some part of the 
failing firm’s obligations.  
 
Without the FDICs guarantee authority, the ability of the Fed to help facilitate the acquisition 
of failing financial institutions by using 13(3), and the ability to inject capital into parts of the 
financial system, the resolution authority alone is an inadequate defense against the extreme 
crisis.  
 
Overall, the combination of the new constraint on risk-taking and the new resolution 
authority provides a better system than we had before the crisis for confronting less severe 
financial trauma. The higher capital requirements and more conservative funding should 
also help reduce the probability of the systemic financial crisis. But the new regime will not 
enable our successors to contain the damage to the economy from an extreme crisis or to 
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break a classic financial panic. To do that, they will be required to request new authority 
from the Congress to provide guarantees and inject public capital into the financial system.  
 
This new system of prudential safeguards and stronger resolution authority would be more 
effective for bank-dominated financial systems. It is less effective in the more complex 
financial systems of the United States, where the reach of both the constraints on risk and 
the reach of the safety net are more limited, a diverse mix of financial institutions can operate 
outside those limits, and the economy relies on a mix of other funding sources that do not 
depend on the balance sheets of banks.  
 
Over time, it would be prudent for the United States to build a stronger emergency financial 
arsenal, with greater discretion for the Fed, the FDIC, and the Treasury, to provide the 
protections in a crisis that the market cannot provide on its own.  
 
If we are to have a credible chance of limiting the probability of the potential damage caused 
by future crises, the U.S. needs a stronger arsenal of tools and more discretion in how to 
deploy those tools.  
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Appendix: Chronology 
 
TLSF. On Tuesday, March 11, 2008, the Fed announced the Term Securities Lending Facility, 
which would allow primary dealers to exchange their holdings of agency securities for 
Treasuries. This facility helped mitigate the impact of the emerging illiquidity of GSE 
securities. The market’s reaction to the announcement was mixed. Whatever reassurance it 
brought was clouded by the view that it was designed to help Bear Stearns and by fears that 
our action reflected alarming concern about funding pressures on the major investment 
banks and more broadly. 
Bear Stearns. On Friday, March, 14, we announced a back-to-back loan through JPMorgan 
to Bear Stearns to help Bear survive to the weekend. That Sunday, March 16, we announced 
that the FRBNY would take on a $30 billion portfolio of Bear’s assets to help facilitate 
JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear. This marked the first use of Section 13(3) since the Great 
Depression. When JPMorgan raised the price it would pay for Bear, we renegotiated our 
agreement with JPMorgan so that they would absorb the first $1 billion of any loss on that 
portfolio.  
PDCF. Also on Sunday, March 16, 2008, we established the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF) to allow the Fed’s 20 broker dealers to borrow from the FRBNY against a set of 
relatively high-grade collateral. Primary dealers used the PDCF like depository institutions 
used the Fed’s discount window, which provided these primary dealers with a liquidity 
source when funding was scarce.  
The four remaining investment banks. FRBNY began informal “monitoring” of four 
remaining independent investment banks in cooperation with the SEC. In the weeks 
following the establishment of the PDCF, the FRBNY assigned teams to examine the liquidity 
positions of these financial firms. Our objective was to encourage them to move to adopt a 
stronger liquidity cushion, and reduce the risk they took false comfort from the new Fed 
backstop. This gave us more insight into their relative vulnerabilities and allowed us to see 
first-hand the ongoing erosion in Lehman’s funding over the course of the following months.  
IndyMac. FDIC intervened in the California thrift IndyMac after the bank failed on July 11. At 
the time of failure, IndyMac had approximately $32 billion in assets. All general unsecured 
creditors, subordinated debt, and stockholders were completely wiped out. IndyMac has yet 
to pay back $9 billion to depositors and $25 million to general creditors.  
HERA. On July 13, Secretary Paulson asked Congress to pass legislation providing authority 
to place the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship or receivership with 
funding from Treasury. On July 30, 2008, the government passed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA), which replaced the GSEs’ existing regulators with the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) and enabled the FHFA to take the GSEs into funded conservatorship 
or receivership. HERA also gave Treasury authority to inject capital into the GSEs if 
necessary, effectively allowing Treasury to stand behind the GSEs’ $5 trillion in combined 
securities and MBS.  
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Developments over the late spring/summer.  
Drafting a framework. Staff at Treasury, FRB, and FRBNY engaged in a broader 
effort to prepare for a more severe crisis by drafting the framework for additional 
emergency authority from Congress to “resolve” a failing investment bank, and to 
purchase assets or inject capital into the financial system.  
During this time, FRBNY pushed JPMorgan and BONY to raise margin requirements 
and limit their access to the riskier collateral in the $12 trillion tripartite repo market.  
Lehman. Treasury and Fed engaged in concerted effort to induce Lehman to raise 
capital or merge with a stronger partner. Lehman pursued a range of options, but 
none were successful, at least not on terms attractive enough to Lehman’s 
management and board. Over the summer and into September, Lehman tried and 
failed to spin off a $30 billion portfolio of real estate assets, or SpinCo, as it was 
commonly known. 
The GSE Conservatorship. The FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship on 
September 6, 2008. On September 7, Treasury established a line of equity with each GSE in 
the amount of $100 billion and immediately injected $1 billion of capital into each. That day, 
Treasury also entered into an agreement to purchase the GSEs’ MBS and began purchases 
later in the month.  
Lehman Weekend.  
“Meeting of the families.” On Friday September 12, Geithner, Paulson and Federal 
Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh, a  convened the heads of 12 banks and investment 
banks at the FRBNY to explore ways to prevent failures of Lehman, Merrill, and AIG. 
Lehman declares bankruptcy. In the early morning hours of Monday, September 
15, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy after Barclays pulled out of merger talks on 
Sunday. Over the next several days, the FRBNY lent between $40 and $60 billion a day 
to Lehman’s U.S. primary dealer to help facilitate a more orderly unwinding of its 
approximately $67-72 billion of assets. Lehman’s London administrator seized 
collateral in London.  
Merrill sold to Bank of America. Around the same time that Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy, Bank of America announced publicly that it had agreed to purchase 
Merrill Lynch for about $50 billion. 
Exemption of section 23A. On September 14, Fed approved an exemption to section 23A of 
the Federal Reserve Act, allowing affiliates of banks to obtain financing from the Fed for 
assets that they would have financed using repo.  
Reserve Primary Fund. Money Market Funds were struggling to satisfy redemptions and 
stopped buying commercial paper. This panic accelerated when the London administrator 
of the Lehman bankruptcy seized collateral. On Tuesday, September 16 the Reserve Primary 
Fund “broke the buck.” The fund held $785 million in Lehman commercial paper, which it 
wrote down to zero within a matter of days before closing. The effect on the Reserve Primary 
Fund led to a general run on prime money market funds. During the week following 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, investors withdrew $230 billion from money market mutual funds.  
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Loan to AIG. On September 16, FRBNY announced an $85 billion rescue package, in the form 
of a revolving credit facility, for AIG, aimed at alleviating liquidity pressures derived from 
collateral calls on AIG’s CDS portfolios business. In return for access to the credit line, AIG 
was to post adequate and equally valued collateral and was to provide the government 
senior voting preferred stock convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s common shares, held by an 
independent trust for the benefit of Treasury. Any utilization of the credit facility by AIG 
came with a commitment fee and penalty rate. 
Swap lines with the G10. On September 16, the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) 
delegated authority to establish swap lines to the currency subcommittee, enabling the Fed 
to establish swap lines with any of the G10 banks without requiring an official vote from the 
FOMC. On September 18, the Fed established swap lines with the Bank of Canada and Bank 
of England, and increased its swap lines with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss 
National Bank. On September 24, the Fed extended swap lines to the all the remaining 
members of the G10 except New Zealand (the Fed established a swap line with New Zealand 
on October 24).  
TARP first request. After Lehman weekend, Paulson returned to Washington to consult 
with the President on new emergency authority. On Thursday, September 18, Paulson and 
Bernanke went to Congress and requested hundreds of billions of dollars for a new 
emergency authority. Paulson sent Congressional leaders his preliminary draft of TARP that 
weekend.  
Money Market Mutual Fund Guarantee. On September 19, Treasury announced a 
preliminary guarantee of prime money market funds up to $50 billion. On September 29, 
Treasury officially announced a guarantee of the money market funds, which totaled 
approximately $3.4 trillion.  
AMLF. On September 19, 2008, the Fed announced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act to provide funding in the form of nonrecourse loans to U.S. depository 
institutions, bank holding companies, broker-dealer subsidiaries, and U.S. branches of 
foreign banks. The AMLF was meant to create a market for asset backed commercial paper. 
Fed purchased Fannie and Freddie’s securities. On September 19, 2008, Fed announced 
its intent to purchase short-term debt from Fannie, Freddie, and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks (FHLBs). By the time that the program concluded on September 26, the FRBNY had 
purchased $14.5 billion in short-term agency debt. 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley become Bank Holding Companies. On September 21, the 
Fed agreed to convert Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into Bank Holding Companies, on 
the condition they each immediately raised additional capital. Goldman raised an aggregate 
$10 billion from Warren Buffett and a public offering. Morgan Stanley raised $9 billion from 
Mitsubishi. Although we wanted to make it appear like Morgan and Goldman had received 
additional protection as BHCs, both banks remained close to failure until Congress passed 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on October 3. The EESA allowed Treasury to inject 
capital into both banks and enabled them to issue new debt backed by an FDIC guarantee. 
FDIC intervened in Washington Mutual. On September 25, JPMorgan bought WaMu and 
took most of its liabilities, including its covered bonds and other secured debt. All of WaMu’s 
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equity was wiped out. In addition, WaMu’s general creditors, senior debt holders, and 
subordinated debtholders lost nearly $15 billion.  
Wachovia sold to Wells Fargo. On Monday September 29, the FDIC initially agreed to sell 
Wachovia to CitiGroup, invoking, for the first time in the crisis, the systemic risk exemption, 
which allowed the FDIC to guarantee liabilities of the holding company. On October 2, Wells 
Fargo, which had been in competition with Citi, submitted a better deal, offering to purchase 
Wachovia for $7 per-share. Wells’ offer was seven times higher than Citi’s offer and did not 
require FDIC assistance. Wells acquired Wachovia and none of Wachovia’s creditors suffered 
losses since the FDIC never took the bank into receivership.  
Swap lines with Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. Emerging global markets, 
particularly those that had relied heavily on dollar funding, began facing serious strains in 
the wake of Lehman and its aftermath. Liquidity constraints in these markets caused many 
of their respective sovereign currencies to fluctuate and their CDS to rise. On September 29, 
the Fed established swap lines of $30 billion each for Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. 
By extending swap lines to these four countries, the Fed attempted to counteract the capital 
flow reversal in these emerging markets. This action also marked the first time that the Fed 
had established swap lines with any of the four banks except Mexico.  
Congress passed TARP. Congress did not pass an emergency funding bill on October 1. On 
October 3, however, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which 
included the Troubled Asset Relief Program. TARP provided Treasury a total of $700 billion 
to buy troubled assets, of which $350 billion was immediately available. The other $350 
billion was contingent on additional Congressional approval. Treasury initially planned to 
use the funding to conduct mainly asset purchases, but Paulson officially shifted Treasury’s 
strategy to mainly capital injections on October 13.  
CPFF. The Fed announced the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility on October 
7 to provide liquidity to commercial paper issuers in the event that short-term financing was 
not available, intending to restart the short-term lending market. The FRBNY provided 
three-month loans to a new limited liability company, the CPFF LLC, which purchased highly-
rated commercial paper from eligible issuers on top of a small facility fee.  
Interest rate cuts. G10 central banks announced a coordinated interest rate cut on October 
8, marking the first instance that the Fed had coordinated a reduction in interest rates with 
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